Germany's Neuer Markt was the largest of numerous new stock markets introduced in Europe during the nineties of the last century to address small and medium sized innovative growth firms. We argue that access to public equity markets is particularly valuable for such firms. However, the conception of the Neuer Markt contained some regulatory flaws, and the Neuer Markt developed along with a tremendous stock price bubble that broke clamorously in early 2000. As a consequence, the reputation of the Neuer Markt suffered from an extraordinary decline in market value and numerous scandals and insolvencies. Primary markets came to an almost complete standstill, and the Neuer Markt had to be abandoned at the end of 2002. Thus, apart from the window of opportunity provided by the short-lived Neuer Markt, the question of how German innovative growth firms could enter public equity markets remains unresolved. From this state of affairs, we expect negative effects on innovation and growth in the German economy.
oriented, with certain disadvantages like a lack of flexibility and the missing disciplining effect on management of an active takeover market, but also with the some advantages from relationship financing like a higher degree of long term thinking, better conditions for long term and specific investments and better support of firms in financial distress through their relationship lender, the so called "Hausbank".
2 Seemingly, this system is a valid alternative to the market oriented financial systems mainly to be found in Anglo-Saxon countries. Why change this?
In the eighties, public debate focused on the so-called "Eigenkapitallücke", i. e., "equity gap".
It was observed that German firms held, by international comparison, a relatively low ratio of equity to total assets. At the end of the seventies, this rate was at about 50% in the United
States or Great Britain, whereas German firms had to do with about 20% only (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1981 /82, Claussen, 1984 . It was assumed that this capital structure was not endogenously chosen but result of exogenous restrictions for German firms to raise equity capital. In the years after the war, the ensuing high leverage was not necessarily harmful because, due to persistent growth, almost all economic enterprises were to some degree successful.
However, this did not hold anymore when the economic crises' from the seventies onwards put many firms periodically under financial stress. The number of bankruptcies rose from values below 3000 at the beginning of the sixties to more than 9000 in 1980. 3 Somewhat tautologically and in contrast with the alleged advantages of the German "Hausbank" system, equity was understood as the main instrument to avoid bankruptcy. Thus, to better the financial situation of German firms, to reduce the number of bankruptcies and thereby enhance the stability of the German economic system, it seemed an urgent task to improve firms' access to equity markets.
Recommendations aimed at the renewal of the Stock Exchange Act to lower the entry barriers to capital markets. Until 1987, the German Stock Exchange Act distinguished between an official quotation and a non-official quotation only. 4 The Stock Exchange Act settled the listing requirements for a listing in the Official Trading. Official brokers were responsible for a price quotation and execution. The Stock Exchange Act did not settle the non-official quotation. The
Stock Exchanges were only authorized to "permit a regulated inofficial market for securities […] provided that the proper conduct of trading and settlement appears to be assured by trading guidelines" ( § 78 Stock Exchange Act ).
The Official Trading achieved a sufficient degree of liquidity and trading activity in large stocks, which might be attributed to the relatively high listing requirements and stricter regu-latory environment. By comparison, the non-official quotation was not very attractive for the issuers and the investors because of low liquidity and therefore high transaction costs (Schrader, 1993) . Only a small number of specialized investors became active in this market segment. Seemingly, the ordinary investor needed a much stronger protection to be willing to invest his money in rather small and opaque firms. The Official Trading, on the other hand, might have provided such an environment, but was, due to its strict requirements, regarded as too expensive for small-and mid-caps. Thus, the potential capital market reform suffered from the dilemma that the new laws could not at the same time lower entry barriers through lower listing requirements and at the same time increase market liquidity through stricter regulations.
The compromise was to introduce a new market segment placed, with regard to listing requirements concerning size and age of the company and the contents of the issuing prospectus, in-between the Official Trading and Unregulated Market. Simultaneously, the legislator was forced to implement three recent directives of the European Community. 5 The objective of these directives was an Europe-wide harmonization of security trading and a strengthening of the listing-requirements to achieve a better investor protection. These prescriptions were contrary to the chosen compromising approach to make listing easier for small and midsized companies. Consequently, to implement the directives of the European Community, the listing requirements were heightened for the Official Trading in 1986 by inauguration of the Stock Exchange Admission Regulation, whereas the new market segment for small-and midcaps was established as Regulated Market.
At first sight, these modifications led to an increased use of public equity markets to raise equity capital. The issued capital of domestic companies in the eighties was as high as in the past 35 years combined (von Rosen, 1995 Exchanges. On the Germany stock exchanges, the number of IPO companies was 146 (von Rosen, 1995) . Moreover, the age of companies going public in Germany was, depending on the observation period, 41 to 49 years on average, that is three or four times higher than in the USA and even four to five times higher than in the UK (Neumann, 1997 , for the US, Goergen/Renneboog, 2001, for the UK comparison). If at all, the reform had been only a partial success.
Seemingly, the German capital markets suffered from regulatory flaws impeding, in particular, young and innovative growth firms to enter public equity markets. This contrasted sharply with the outstanding success of the American NASDAQ in this regard. 6 The respective failure of the German financial markets was more and more understood as a severe obstruction to the innovation process. Research results on the relationship between innovation, venture capital and going public give strong scientific support to this notion. 7 However, young and innovative firms did not fit into the Official Trading, where firms of many times their size were listed.
On the other hand, the Regulated Market provided an insufficient degree of liquidity, and the Stock Exchange Act did not cover the Unofficial Regulated Market that remained to be "an opaque and illiquid inter-broker telephone market with low listing requirements" (Ljungqvist, 1997 (Ljungqvist, , p. 1311 .
Therefore, some German firms even went public at the American NASDAQ, and more planned to do so. 8 Thus, both efficiency arguments and the growing international competitions between different stock exchanges brought up the urge for the Frankfurt stock exchange to introduce a special market segment with a strong law-protected background to address particularly innovative small-and mid-cap firms (Hopt/Rudolph/Baums, 1997 , Büschgen, 1997 .
Given this new focus on innovative growth firms, discussion in the mid nineties was back where it had been in the early eighties. However, the experiences of the failed reform from 1986 had to be implemented into the design of the new structure of the German equity markets and should have led to a rather different structure than the earlier, compromising approach. To achieve this new structure through legal means only would have made it necessary to modify the existing Stock Exchange Act substantially. Thus, to remedy things rapidly and achieve a higher degree of flexibility and efficiency, the Deutsche Börse AG (as the responsible body for the Frankfurt Stock Exchange) choose as mezzanine legal status for the new market segment, containing, in particular, a private organization of trading in the context of a public stock exchange.
If insufficient investor protection was at the heart of failure of the Regulated Market, stricter rules were required to gain the trust of the public. Whereas large firms often attain some degree of publicity and transparency through their manifold business activities in a natural way, a market segment for small and medium sized firms had to supply sufficient information for investors through comprehensive and resolutely enforced disclosure rules. Furthermore, it could be argued that young growth firms are more flexible and less bureaucratic compared to larger firms, and that the inherent tendency of large bureaucracies to adhere to rules set up by the authorities might offer an additional margin of investor protection that is not available in smaller and less law-abiding firms. Thus, the new conception could not be a compromise. It had to contain more and not less information requirements and investor protection than does the rules for the Official Trading.
The general acceptance of the new market segment relied on investors' trust, i. e., on the positive prejudices of the common investor about the reliability of the supplied information and the fairness and efficiency of market transactions. German investors are said to be cautious and skeptical concerning stock markets. Thus, the development of a better understanding and trust into equity investments at stock markets, of so called "Aktienkultur" ("stock culture"), was understood as a main prerequisite for a better development of the German stock markets.
The new market segment had to stand the respective test of trustworthiness. If it succeeded, along with the induced new investment behavior the structure of the German financial system might change altogether. Capital market access for young and innovative firms might spur innovation and give new growth opportunity to the somewhat limping German economy. If it failed, even just to some degree, positive expectations could turn into generally negative prejudices about the new market segment and about share investments in general. The consequences for the German financial system and economy could be lasting stagnation. Thus, stakes were high when the new market segment was introduced.
The Design of the Neuer Markt
On March 10 th , 1997, the Deutsche Börse AG founded the Neuer Markt as a privately organized market. However, to achieve the status of a "regulated market" in accordance with the Investment Services Directive of the European Community, 9 the admission to the Neuer Markt required an admission to the Geregelter Markt with a simultaneous waiver of being listed at the Geregelter Markt in favor of a listing at the Neuer Markt (Kersting, 1997).
As discussed above, the main purpose of the admission guidelines was not to facilitate going public but to gain investors trust. Consequently, the listing requirements were even higher than for an admission to the Official Trading, at least on the paper. A further impediment to going public was the need to inaugurate at least two designated sponsors. The designated sponsors were obliged to post price indications or spreads continuously. Thus, designated sponsors were responsible to guarantee liquidity and tradability of the shares. Thereby, they lowered the transactions costs for investors. However, the general public expected the desig-nated sponsors to do more than that in the creation of trust. At least some investors wanted them to guarantee fair transactions and a good conduct of the firms they were sponsoring. To emphasize the credibility of the extensive listing requirements, the issuer was obliged to pay a fine up to 100,000 € to the Deutsche Börse AG for each non-performance, delayed or incomplete performance of the obligations resulting from an admission to the Neuer Markt. It might be discussed if this amount was sufficient. However, the private status of the Neuer Markt restricted the means of enforcement, in particular with respect to non-monetary sanctions that are particularly valuable in distress when monetary penalties are no longer credible.
At the same time, new laws for ad hoc-publicity and insider trading had been implemented for the whole German capital market, and a new regulatory agency, the Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel, had been installed to enforce the respective regulation to bolster market discipline and thus enhance investor protection. Together with the special requirements of the Neuer Markt, a seemingly powerful set of rules and regulations gave support to high expectations for the success to the Neuer Markt as segment for young and innovative growth firms offering high investment risk, but likewise high expected returns due to high transparency, investor protection and ensuing high liquidity.
The Marketing
The Neuer Markt intended to facilitate the research of banks and other information intermediaries through high requirements concerning listing and publication, to reduce transaction costs through designated sponsors, and to raise the investors' readiness for trading through a strong national and international publicity (Francioni/Gutschlag, 1998) The efforts of the Deutsche Börse AG to establish a high reputation for the Neuer Markt met with a great resonance in the market on the side of potential IPO candidates. In 1997, 11 of 16 listed companies at the Neuer Markt declared that the good image of the Neuer Markt was the main motive for a listing in this segment in favor of a listing in another market segment (Theissen, 1998) . Thus, the Neuer Markt became very prestigious soon, and firms could enter this attractive market segment with a rather short track record and low turnover that would not be sufficient to enter the Official Trading or the Regulated Market. Despite a rather small number of IPOs during its first year, the Neuer Markt was set on the track to high publicity and good reputation by the end of 1997 and promised to become a big success.
The impressive (but temporary) success story of the Neuer Markt

Underpricing, investor behavior and IPO frenzy
The initial success of the Neuer Markt becomes more stunning through a comparison with the development of other public equity market segments in Germany in the preceding years. It was not only the Neuer Markt that profited from this hot issue phase. Even firms that did not fit into the conception of the Neuer Markt considered going public more seriously now, and some decided to use the favorable IPO climate to enter other market segments. Thus, the number of quoted shares increased markedly in all market segments, although by a lesser degree than at the Neuer Markt. Furthermore, the IPOs at the Official Trading, although small in number, mobilized high aggregated gross proceeds because, on the average, much larger firms went public in this market segment than in the other market segments (see Table 3 below). Presumably they were not, and many private investors were surprised and embarrassed that they usually received more shares of issues that showed a lower underpricing in comparison to issues that were higher underpriced. They alleged that the methods of distribution of new shares were not fair and triggered a public debate that led to very sensible measures in some banks to make the allocation process more transparent. In many IPOs (and obviously, these were the most attractive ones), private investors did receive by far not as many new shares as they intended to buy. To avoid this disappointment, some opened accounts at different banks to multiply their orders. This behavior gave banks additional incentives to promote IPOs and thereby to attract new investors hoping for an additional share in the issues. Nonetheless, because the Neuer Markt was aiming at small growth firms, the issues were much to small to satisfy such general demand, even though many were, seen from today's perspective, much too large for the respective firms. However, a positive secondary market trend made many private investors belief that it did also pay to buy the shares not received in the IPO initially after the IPO on the secondary market. Thus, disappointed investors nurtured underpricing, as underpricing was responsible for their disappointment, because it drew more and more investors to the primary market. In this circle, ref-
lection about the market itself, the issuers and the potential risk of each investment were postponed in favor of the chase for fast money.
Primary Market Participants
Institutional investors often remained skeptical and saw in the Neuer Markt a market for gamblers and freaks. Many of them abstained from investing their own money. However, the gen- Table 3 show more details concerning the distribution of the IPOs over the different market segments. a The total number of IPOs was about 457. For 22 IPOs no sufficient data was available; thus, the data refer to the remaining 435 IPOs only. b Initial Return, market-adjusted with the DAX-100 index refering to the period of the end of the offer period and the first trading price.
Source: Hunger (2002) It is interesting to note which firms went public at the Neuer Markt and which in the other market segments of the Frankfurt stock exchange during the hot issue phase (Burghof/Fischer, 2002) . In general, firms that went public usually grew faster and had higher earnings than privately held firms. However, for Neuer Markt firms this effect was stronger with respect to growth, and for non-Neuer Markt firms with respect to earnings. IPO firms in other market segments were generally older and had no strong financial needs. Thus, the IPO was mainly a device to change the ownership structure of such firms. At least in long run they could achieve dispersed ownership to become a public company in the Berle/Means sense. 13 By contrast, firms that went public at the Neuer Markt were very young, grew faster and had strong financial needs the access to public equity markets was intended to serve. Ownership was concentrated in the hands of managers and founders, before and after the IPO. The relative importance of these inside owners even increased through the IPO because other investors tended to sell relatively more shares. Overall, it must be conceded that the Neuer Markt was able to address young and innovative growth firms, or at least, firms that were capable to appear to fall into this category.
14 The establishment of the Neuer Markt also had strong influence on the venture-capital market because it offered an attractive exit channel. In 1995, only 8 percent of the disinvestments of venture capitalists were done through an IPO (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2000) . Seemingly, at the time venture capitalists should or have to disinvest, most portfolio firms were still too small for a placement at the Official Trading, whereas the other market segments provided no attractive conditions for an IPO. Thus, the Neuer Markt was an ideal exit channel. It gave young growth firms additional prestige and venture capitalists an attractive exit price. Consequently, venture capitalists had a significant share in more than 42% of the IPO firms at the Neuer Markt. 15 In 1998 and 1999, the IPO, usually taking place at the Neuer Markt, was the exit channel for almost 20 percent of all terminated venture capital investments (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2000) . The new earnings from IPOs also changed the relative attractiveness of the investment in venture capital funds that realized spectacular returns for some years. Investments in such funds soared, and many institutional investors set up new entities for such investments.
Secondary markets: bubble and burst
At the end of the last decade, both the numerous IPOs and a strong increase in share prices at the Neuer Markt and the other market segments lead to a strong increase in market capitalization of the whole market. From 355 billion $ in 1990, market capitalization of the main markets and the parallel markets of the Deutsche Börse AG rose to a maximum of 1.432 billion $ in 1999, with a growth rate of more than 30% in 1998 and 1999, i. e., after the founding of the Neuer Markt. Such an increase would soon have led to German public equity markets with similar importance as in the UK or US. However, these countries likewise experienced a general bull market in the late nineties. Thus, the relative distance between the different financial systems might not have changed too much, whereas the absolute numbers reached new and unprecedented levels everywhere.
The development of the market capitalization of the whole German public equity market is given in Figure 2 : The following graph shows the developments of DAX-100, NASDAQ-100 and NEMAX-AllShare indices. Mrz -14-1997 Jun-13-1997 Sep-12-1997 Dez-12-1997 Mrz-13-1998 Jun-12-1998 Sep-11-1998 Dez-11-1998 Mrz-12-1999 Jun-11-1999 Sep-10-1999 Dez-10-1999 
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Figure 4: Market Capitalization and Number of Listed Firms at the Neuer Markt
The crisis of the Neuer Markt began in early 2000, when numerous companies had to confess that they would miss their forecasts from the prospectuses and other publications. At that time, similar announcements came from many firms in Germany and abroad, marking a turning point in the world's business cycle. However, stock market segments with older firms showed more resilience to bad news than did, in particular, the Neuer Markt. Per se, this is no surprise. As mentioned above, the stock prices of many firms at the Neuer Markt could be justified, if at all, only through high expected -not actual -earnings. A change in the general economic outlook should thus hit the stock prices of such firms particularly hard.
However, it became obvious soon that investors had to expect worse than just a sharp correction of unrealistic bubble prices. Seemingly, for many firms at the Neuer Markt strong economic growth, or continuing ignorance of the true state of affairs, was a precondition for their survival. Thus, soon after reaching the turning point of stock prices, rumors spread through market reports and popular stock exchange-magazines that numerous companies listed at the Neuer Markt were threatened by bankruptcy. Blacklists were sent around, containing many well-known names. The management of the respective firms vigorously denied such threats. Although there is, to our best knowledge, no systematic analysis of fraud and failure at the Neuer Markt, from the individual cases we might identify certain typical patterns that show a ominous combination of wrong incentives, lack of supervision and, obviously, immoral misbehavior. To begin with, founder usually would like to sell some of their shares after the IPO to reduce their idiosyncratic exposure and to cash out. To achieve a good price, they might undertake special efforts in investor relations. However, because managers were not obliged to inform ex ante about their selling intentions, investors could not distinguish between the regular information policy on behalf of the firm, and information given with the intention to increase the proceeds of sales by insiders. Therefore it might be obvious that companyannouncements were glossed over by emphasizing good news and protracting bad news.
Such a behavior represents illegal insider trading and should have judicial consequences.
However, it is very difficult to prove such a misbehavior, and the German authorities seemingly lacked the competence to do so. It was easier to find out about the less frequent cases of faked orders, balance sheets or sales, which lead to the only case of an effective condemnation in courts. 21 Altogether, the many cases of alleged fraud and insider trading and almost complete lack of effective sentences contributed to the bad perception of the Neuer Markt.
Furthermore, the huge public interest multiplied the reputation damage. Thus, the value of the brand "Neuer Markt" became negative for both the firms listed at the Neuer Markt and the Deutsche Börse AG itself. The closure of this market segment was the logical consequence.
Causes and consequences The Neuer Markt served a purpose that, at least from a theoretical perspective, creates new value: Besides other potential sources of surplus, it enabled the founders and owners of young and innovative firms to rise equity at the public equity markets while protecting their relationship specific investments through dispersed outside equity. 22 So why did it fail?
In basic idea of the Neuer Markt was to allow young and innovative growth firms to go public through the guarantee of a high degree of transparency and strong regulatory background.
However, as the stepwise tightening of rules in the course of the crisis demonstrates, the original set up contained elements of a compromise. Some of these, like too loose listing and delisting regimes, lacking (ex ante-)publicity for insider sales and insufficient penalties in the case of violations of the rules, might be responsible for some of the adverse incentives, although the general stock price bubble might be the main culprit. To introduce new rules to close the gaps ex post created an ambivalent signal. It could have demonstrated that the Deutsche Börse AG was actively protecting investors. However, it was understood as a signal for the defectiveness of the total system that was seemingly constructed to deceive investors.
The Deutsche Börse AG intended to use the general push of the primary markets at the end of the last decade to firmly establish the new market segment, both in the eye of public and with respect to the competition between the different stock markets in Europe that concentrated on similar IPO candidates. 23 Thus, a large number of firms had to be brought to the market in a very short period of time. Issuing houses and other participants did likewise generate substantial earnings from their IPO activities, and equity was never cheaper for the owner of potential IPO candidates. Thus, the demand and the supply side met with potentially controlling institutions in their demand for more IPOs. Furthermore, some of the listing requirements like the three years track record or the minimum free float of 25% were non-compulsory. As a consequence, among the accepted IPOs there were many that are seen today, with hindsight, as premature. Other IPO candidates lacked a sustainable economic concept or, due to complex and intransparent group structure, a sufficient degree of corporate clarity, which should have been a precondition for any outsider investment. Thus, nowadays, some analysts even say that most of the firms that went public at the Neuer Markt were not really prepared for this step (Hess/Lehmann/Lüders, 2001) . However, a different economic development might have led to other conclusions.
Like the destruction of investors' trust after the breaking of the bubble, some other potential causes for the failure of the Neuer Markt did trouble the whole financial system, but hit the Neuer Markt as a newly established market segment particularly strong. Examples are the ineffectiveness of auditing firms in protecting the public against faked numbers in annual and quarterly reports, or the irresponsible behavior of investment consultants or stock analysts and conflicts of interest inside banks with respect to stock research and portfolio, respectively, funds management. However, other stock markets or market segments faced these problems with a reputation build over decades, or are, due to their size, indispensable. To some degree, the profound failure of the Neuer Markt was even helpful to the other stock market segments in Germany because it drew attention away from the difficulties they had.
What are the consequences of this failure? Some straightforward observations after the bursting of the bubble are that, for the few IPOs that took place at the Neuer Markt or other market segments, underpricing seemed to have disappeared. Adding to this observation the low level of share prices, we can conclude that going public is no longer attractive for both the supply and the demand side. That does not mean that the concept in itself has lost its attractiveness.
Many firms that had prepared to go public are now waiting for more favorable market conditions (Wieselhuber & Partner, 2002) . However, it is doubtful that such conditions will turn up very soon. The opinion of the general public has turned against the stock markets, and the number of shareholders decreases sharply (see Figure 1 
German Stock Markets after the Neuer Markt -Where do we stand?
The decision of the Deutsche Börse AG to terminate the Neuer Markt was aided by a set of Through the modifications of the Stock Exchange Act, the requirements for stock trading were altered. A "first segment" (official market) takes the place of the former Official Trading. In addition, in a "second segment" (regulated market) the requirements of the former Regulated Market are still valid as a minimum standard. Both segments meet the requirements as a regulated market in the sense of the ECs Directive on Investment Services. Furthermore, the stock exchanges were allowed to demand further requirements for parts of these market segments.
Thus, the Neuer Markt could have been easily adjusted to the new legal situation.
However, the Deutsche Börse AG was looking for modifications that might help to regain investors' trust, or at least to make it easier for investors to forget about past losses and scandals. Thus, ideas on both marketing and institutional design were needed. Obviously, the brand "Neuer Markt" had to be abandoned because it threatened to harm even sound firms traded in this market segment. However, it was indispensable that investors should get the impression that the Deutsche Börse AG did more than just change the name to achieve a true The listing requirements for an admission of shares to the "second segment", i. e., the former Regulated Market, are raised to the requirements of the "first segment", the former Official Trading, and are called General Standard. Already listed companies enter the General Standard automatically. An issuer can apply for a listing at the Prime Standard if the shares are admitted to the General Standard and the issuer meets additional requirements. Thus, the issuer is obliged to prepare consolidated financial statements according to IAS or US-GAAP, to publish quarterly report containing certain specifications, to publish a corporate action timetable, to hold an analyst's conference annually, and to publish ad-hoc announcements in German and English. Interestingly, these requirements are mainly drawn from the Neuer Markt and aim in particular at international investors, as does the English name of both segments.
The Neuer Markt itself will be terminated December 31 The rebranding not only of the Neuer Markt but also of the total German (Frankfurt) stock market is a signal for the profundity of the crisis. However, as the case of the Neuer Markt tells us, it is rather difficult and somewhat paradox to build up reputation through discrete measures and in a short period of time. Thus, the new segmentation and rebranding could be rather costly, whereas gains can be expected in the long run only. Investors need time to learn from their own experience about the reliability and trustworthiness of the new market segments. Generally higher listing requirements and a strict enforcements of the stock exchange rules on listed firms could help to speed up this process, although even they will not win back the trust of a generation of private investors who often lost a fortune. And even such strict rules cannot protect investors from idiosyncratic and general market risk and are thus no guarantee against a further or repeated loss of investors' confidence and trust. Thus, while efficient stock markets might support economic growth, reciprocally the recovery of the German stock markets from their deep and structural crisis might need the help of a general recovery of the economy. Economic stagnation and the inability of the German Governments to reform crucial elements of the public financial system makes it rather improbable that such help is forthcoming.
Thus, the debate is somehow back again where it was ten and twenty years ago: The experiment of the Neuer Markt might have enlarged our knowledge about what kind of stock markets Germany needs, but did, after the closing of a window of opportunity, not provide access to public equity markets for a wide range of firms looking for such an access, and in particular not for small and innovative growth firms. Meanwhile, German stock markets lost a lot of time, reputation, and the option to develop under favorable economic conditions. Thus, although a circular development is not a bad thing in itself, one might get the disturbing feeling that this time the German financial system stumbled down the spiral staircase.
